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TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1924

No. 491

NORTH GERMAN LLOYD, APPELLANT,

vs.

THE UNITED STATES

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS

FILED JUNE 23, 1924

(30,448)

(30,446)

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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No. 481

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[fol. 1] IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS

No. C-313

NORTH GERMAN LLOYD, Claimant,

vs.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant

I. PETITION—Filed Apr. 5, 1923

To the Honorable the Court of Claims:

The claimant, North German Lloyd respectfully represents:

1. That it is, and was at all times hereinafter mentioned, a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Free and Hanseatic City of Bremen in Germany, and of Germany, named and known in the German language as Norddeutscher Lloyd and in the English language as North German Lloyd, and is, and was at all the times hereinafter mentioned, a citizen or subject of the German Government.

2. That the German Government accords to citizens of the United States the right to prosecute claims against it in its courts.

3. That in the month of July, 1914, and for many years prior thereto, claimant was operating steamship services between its home [fol. 2] port of Bremen and other foreign ports and various ports in the United States and other parts of the world, all of which services were in the last part of July and the early part of August, 1914, discontinued by reason of the outbreak of war between Germany and other European powers.

4. That at the time of the outbreak of said war there were in various ports and harbors of the United States and of its territories and insular possessions certain merchant vessels belonging to claimant which had come to said ports and harbors in the ordinary course of trade and commerce prior to the outbreak of said war, and which, after the outbreak of said war, remained therein of necessity as ports of refuge to avoid the risk of capture by the enemy incident to their going to sea in the further prosecution of their voyages.

5. That within a few days or weeks next ensuing after the outbreak of said war there also came into various ports and harbors of the United States and of its territories and insular possessions certain other merchant vessels belonging to claimant, some of which, at the time of the outbreak of said war, were bound to such ports in the ordinary course of commercial voyages, and others of which, being bound on commerical voyages to ports not of the United States, departed from the regular course of their voyages and ran to various ports and harbors of the United States and its territories and insular

possessions to avoid capture, and all of which, having reached ports [fol. 3] or harbors of the United States or of its territories or insular possessions, remained and took refuge therein to avoid the risk of capture by the enemy incident to their again going to sea.

6. That on April 6, 1917, all the merchant vessels belonging to claimant mentioned in the two paragraphs next preceding (and which are hereinafter identified by their names) still remained in various ports and harbors of the United States and of its territories and insular possessions, using the same as ports of refuge, and on said day last mentioned a Joint Resolution was adopted by Congress and approved by the President formally declaring the existence of a state of war between the United States and Germany; and on the same day all of claimant's above mentioned merchant vessels were entered upon and taken possession of by the United States of America, acting by and through its officers and agents.

7. That on May 12, 1917, a Joint Resolution was adopted by Congress and approved by the President, the title and body of which are in the words following, to wit:

"Joint Resolution Authorizing the President to take over for the United States the possession and title of any vessel within its jurisdiction, which at the time of coming therein was owned in whole or in part by any corporation, citizen, or subject of any nation with which the United States may be at war, or was under register of any such nation, and for other purposes.

Resolved, &c.

[fol. 4] "Sec. 1. That the President be, and he is hereby, authorized to take over to the United States the immediate possession and title of any vessel within the jurisdiction thereof, including the Canal Zone and all territories and insular possessions of the United States except the American Virgin Islands, which at the time of coming into such jurisdiction was owned in whole or in part by any corporation, citizen, or subject of any nation with which the United States may be at war when such vessel shall be taken, or was flying the flag of or was under register of any such nation or any political subdivision or municipality thereof; and, through the United States Shipping Board, or any department or agency of the Government, to operate, lease, charter, and equip such vessel in any service of the United States, or in any commerce, foreign or coastwise.

"Sec. 2. That the Secretary of the Navy be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to appoint, subject to the approval of the President, a board of survey, whose duty it shall be to ascertain the actual value of the vessel, its equipment, appurtenances, and all property contained therein, at the time of its taking, and to make a written report of their findings to the Secretary of the Navy, who shall preserve such report with the records of his department. These findings shall be considered as competent evidence in all proceedings on any claim for compensation."

8. That on various dates within a period of not more than one year subsequent to May 12, 1917, there was taken over, or purported to be taken over, to the United States by virtue of executive orders made by the President under the authority of the Joint Resolution set forth [fol. 5] in the preceding paragraph, the title to all of claimant's above-mentioned merchant vessels.

9. That in the following statement claimant states, so far as lies within its knowledge, the various executive orders under which title to its said vessels was taken, or purported to be taken, by the United States, and the Government agencies which acted in behalf of the United States in taking over said vessels, and also sets forth the names of its said vessels, their type and tonnage, and their respective values as of April 6, 1917, the day when they were first taken into possession by the United States, and as of the dates of the taking of title to its vessels respectively by the United States.

Vessels Taken Over to the United States Through the United States Shipping Board under Executive Order of June 30, 1917

A. Passenger Steamers

Name	Tonnage	Value
Kaiser Wilhelm II ..	19,361 gross register tons....	$12,500,000.00
Kronprinzessin Cecile	19,503 " " "	14,000,000.00

B. Combined Passenger and Freight Steamers

Name	Tonnage	Value
Barbarossa	10,984 gross register tons....	$3,295,200.00
Borneo	2,168 " " "	542,000.00
Coblenz	3,130 " " "	516,450.00
Friedrich d. Grosse..	10,771 " " "	3,231,300.00
George Washington.	25,570 " " "	12,785,000.00
Grosser Kurfuerat...	13,102 " " "	4,258,150.00
Koeln	7,409 " " "	1,222,500.00
Neckar	9,835 " " "	2,704,625.00
Prinzess Alice	10,981 " " "	3,843,350.00
Prinzess Irene	10,893 " " "	3,812,550.00
Rhein	10,058 " " "	2,765,950.00
Willehad	4,761 " " "	785,565.00
Wittekind	5,640 " " "	030,600.00
Darvel	1,508 " " "	377,000.00
Marudu	1,514 " " "	378,500.00
Prinz Waldemar ...	3,227 " " "	839,020.00

[fol. 6]

C. Freight Steamers

Name	Tonnage	Value
Elsass	11,220 dead weight tons	$2,805,000.00
Mark	11,496 " " "	2,874,000.00
Pommern	12,674 " " "	3,168,500.00
Rajah	3,250 " " "	487,500.00
Tsingtau	2,500 " " "	275,000.00
Tuebingen	6,775 " " "	846,875.00
Pongtong	2,000 " " "	350,000.00

Vessels Taken Over to the United States Through the United States Navy under Executive Order of May 22, 1917

A. Passenger Steamers

Name	Tonnage	Value
Kronzprinz Wilhelm	14,908 gross register tons	$8,000,000.00

B. Combined Passenger and Freight Steamers

Name	Tonnage	Value
Prinz Eitel Friedrich	8,797 gross register tons	$3,298,875.00

C. Freight Steamers

Name	Tonnage	Value
Locksun	2,000 dead weight tons	$350,000.00

Vessels Taken Over to the United States But by What Department of the Government or under What Executive Order Claimant Is not Informed

A. Combined Passenger and Freight Steamers

Name	Tonnage	Value
Breslau	7,524 gross register tons	$1,316,700.00

10. That no compensation has at any time been paid or awarded for the value of said vessels, title to which was taken over by the United States as aforesaid.

11. That claimant hereby claims from the United States of America: The sum of Ninety-two million five hundred and sixty [fol. 7] thousand two hundred and ten dollars ($92,560,210), being the aggregate reasonable value of its aforesaid ships, both as of April 6, 1917, and as of the dates when the title to the said ships respectively was taken over to the United States.

12. This suit is founded upon:

(a) The Constitution of the United States of America.

(b) The Joint Resolution of Congress, adopted May 12, 1917, and hereinbefore set forth, which conecmplates that compensation shall be paid for vessels taken over to the United States by virtue of its provisions.

(c) An implied contract with the Government, arising out of the facts hereinbefore stated, that compensation shall be paid for the value of claimant's vessels expropriated by the United States as herein set forth, as of the date when title thereto was taken over by the United States.

(d) A claim, not sounding in tort, for unliquidated damages for the reasonable value of claimant's said vessels as of the date when the United States took over title thereto.

13. That no action has been had on this claim in Congress (except as the Joint Resolution of May 12, 1917, hereinbefore set forth constitutes action) or by any of the Departments, nor has any request or application for action concerning the same been made; that the claimant, North German Lloyd, is the sole owner of this claim and [fol. 8] no other person or corporation is interested therein; that no assignment or transfer of this claim or of any interest therein has been made; that claimant is justly entitled to the amount herein claimed from the United States of America after allowing all just credits and offsets; that claimant has not in any way voluntarily aided, abetted or given encouragement to rebellion against the United States; and that claimant and its agent executing this petition in its behalf) believes the facts as stated in this petition to be true.

14. That neither claimant nor any assignees of claimant has pending in any other court any suit or process against any person who, at the time when the cause of action alleged in such suit or process arose, was, in respect thereto, acting or professing to act, mediately or immediately, under the authority of the United States, which suit or process is based upon the facts herein stated or any of such facts, or has reference to the subject matter of this petition.

15. That this petition is filed in the Court of Claims within six years after the claims herein set forth first accrued.

16. That this petition is signed by claimant's duly appointed attorney of record, and, claimant being a body corporate, is also signed and verified in its behalf by its general agent and attorney in fact in the United States thereunto duly authorized, and claimant makes profert of its agent's power of attorney authorizing him to act in its behalf, and annexed hereto and makes part hereof a [fols. 9 & 10] true copy of said power of attorney.

North German Lloyd, Claimant, by H. Schüngel, General Agent and Attorney in Fact. Edgar W. Hunt, Attorney of Record.

Jurat showing the foregoing was duly sworn to by H. Schüngel omitted in printing.

[fol. 11] II. Defendant's Demurrer—Filed May 26, 1923

Defendant demurs to the petition in the above entitled case for the reason that it does not state a cause of action against the United States.

Robert H. Lovett, Assistant Attorney General. W. F. Norris, Attorney.

III. Argument and Submission of Demurrer

On February 18, 19 and 20, 1924, the demurrers in this and similar cases, were argued by Messrs. W. F. Norris and Herman J. Galloway, for the defendants, and by Mr. Edgar W. Hunt, on February 19, for the plaintiff in this case, and the demurrer was submitted.

IV. Order of Court Dismissing Petition, and Memorandum—Entered March 17, 1924

This case was submitted upon the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's petition. On consideration whereof, the court being of opinion that the demurrer is well taken doth adjudge and order this 17th day of March, 1924, that the said demurrer be and the same is sustained, and the petition is dismissed.

Memorandum

The petition claims an amount as the reasonable value of certain passenger and freight steamers belonging to plaintiff and "taken over" by the Government of the United States. The court concludes that it has not jurisdiction for the reasons stated in its opinion in Deutsch-Australische Dampfschiffs-Gesellschaft Case, No. C-576, decided March 17, 1924.

[fol. 12] V. Opinion of the Court Referred to in Court's Memorandum—Decided March 17, 1924

No. C-576

Deutsch-Australische Dampfschiffs-Gesellschaft

v.

The United States

Campbell, Chief Justice, delivered the opinion of the court:

This case is before the court upon the defendant's demurrer to the petition, which in substance avers: Plaintiff is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Germany, and is a citizen of Germany, and at the times mentioned in the petition was engaged in the business of operating steamships, of which it was the owner of many, its principal office and place of business being at Hamburg, Germany. In or about the month of May or June, 1917, pursuant to authority granted by the joint resolution of May 12, 1917 (hereinafter set forth), the President of the United States "took over to the United States the immediate possession and control" of the plaintiff's steamers which then were within the jurisdiction of the United States or its insular possessions and which were the sole and exclusive property of plaintiff and in its possession. The names of the six steamers and the alleged fair and rea-onable value of each is stated, and the aggregate value was $9,022,000.

Also it is alleged that certain stores and equipment belonging to the several steamers were also taken over, and that by the taking over of the possession and control of the steamers in the manner stated and "thus appropriating the said steamers to its own use, enjoyment, and benefit," the United States impliedly agreed with plaintiff to pay plaintiff the fair and reasonable value of said steamers, and also for their stores and equipment, but that they have wholly failed and refused to pay the same. It is further averred that the survey required by section 2 of the joint resolution has been duly made and report thereof filed with the Secretary of the Navy. The claim is for the alleged aggregate value of the steamers besides the value of their coal, stores and equipment. A further claim of $10 per deadweight ton per month for each steamer as the value of its use is made in the petition, but the plaintiff abandoned this claim, insisting, however, upon the alleged value of its property. It was explained in argument that the several steamers, with the exception of those in Cuban harbors, were all in American harbors at the outbreak of the war. They were merchant vessels which had sought asylum in these harbors and were left unmolested until the United States entered the war. There were fifteen other suits involving vessels of the alleged aggregate value of over $30,000,000 submitted with this one, besides a large number of similar cases heard at the same time.

[fol. 13] On April 6, 1917, the Congress adopted the joint resolu-

tion declaring the existence of a state of war between the United States and the Imperial Government of Germany. On that day some of the vessels in question were taken into possession and control by agents of the United States Government. On May 12, 1917, the Congress adopted a joint resolution as follows:

"Chap. 13. Joint resolution authorizing the President to take over for the United States the possession and title of any vessel within its jurisdiction, which at the time of coming therein was owned in whole or in part by any corporation, citizen, or subject of any nation with which the United States may be at war, or was under register of any such nation, and for other purposes.

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President be, and he is hereby, authorized to take over to the United States the immediate possession and title of any vessel within the jurisdiction thereof, including the Canal Zone and all territories and insular possessions of the United States except the American Virgin Islands, which at the time of coming into such jurisdiction was owned in whole or in part by any corporation, citizen, or subject of any nation with which the United States may be at war when such vessel shall be taken, or was flying the flag of or was under register of any such nation or any political subdivision or municipality thereof; and through the United States Shipping Board, or any department or agency of the Government, to operate, lease, charter, and equip such vessel in any service of the United States, or in any commerce, foreign or coastwise.

"Sec. 2. That the Secretary of the Navy be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to appoint, subject to the approval of the President, a board of survey, whose duty it shall be to ascertain the actual value of the vessel, its equipment, appurtenances, and all property contained therein, at the time of its taking, and to make a written report of their findings to the Secretary of the Navy, who shall preserve such report with the records of his department. These findings shall be considered as competent evidence in all proceedings on any claim for compensation."

By proclamation dated June 30, 1917, which incorporated the joint resolution of May 12 and mentioned by name 69 German ships, it was ordered by the President that "through the United States Shipping Board there be taken over to the United States the possession and title of the aforementioned vessels. The United States Shipping Board is further hereby authorized to repair, equip, and man the said vessels; to operate, lease, or charter the same in any service of the United States or in any commerce, foreign or coastwise; and to do and perform any and all things that may be necessary to accomplish the purposes of the joint resolution above set forth."

A question presented at the threshold is whether the Court of Claims has jurisdiction in the premises. The plaintiff contends that

the allegations bring its case within the scope of section 145, Judicial Code, conferring power to hear and determine claims founded upon the Constitution or any law of Congress, or upon implied contract with the United States. The action is not founded upon the Constitution or a law of Congress. The joint resolution authorized the President to take title to the vessels and he did so. It does not in terms declare a liability of the Government or of itself create a right in plaintiff. It was said by Judge Richardson in Ludington's case, 15 C. Cls. 453, that to sustain a claim as one founded on a law of Congress there must be "a statute liability on the part of the Government." See Hukill case, 16 C. Cls. 562. In Hvoslef case, [fol. 14] 237 U. S. 1, 11, the statute authorized and directed the payment of certain claims. The act construed in the Medbury case, 173 U. S. 492, created the right to payment.

Where suits for compensation have been maintained because of the taking by the Government of private property for public use they were not founded upon the Constitution or the Fifth Amendment or a law of Congress, but upon an implied contract arising out of the circumstances of the taking. In United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U. S. 645, one of the earliest cases on the subject, the principle was announced, and it has been repeatedly reaffirmed. In United States v. North American Transportation & Trading Co., 253 U. S. 330, 335, it was said: "The right to bring this suit against the United States in the Court of Claims is not founded upon the Fifth Amendment, but upon the existence of an implied contract entered into by the United States." See Tempel case, 248 U. S. 121, 129; Peabody case, 231 U. S. 530, 539; Klebe case, — U. S. —, decided November 12, 1923 (57 C. Cls., 160). The circumstances of the case may rebut the implication of such a contract. Horstmann case, 257 U. S. 138, 146; Ball Engineering Co. v. White & Co., 250 U. S. 46, 57; Klebe Case, supra.

It was the action taken in virtue of the joint resolution that deprived plaintiff of its property, and the question is whether the circumstances gave rise to the implication of a contract of which the Court of Claims has jurisdiction. Manifestly the joint resolution was an exercise of the war power of Congress. It finds support in the constitutional provision that empowers Congress to declare war and to make rules concerning captures on land and water. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 11. See Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239, 242; Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U. S. 51; Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch 110, 126; Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268, 305; Fischer v. Palmer, 259 Fed. 355. Salamandra Ins. Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 254 Fed. 852. Several of these cases deal with the trading with the enemy act, but that act granted broad powers to the Alien Property Custodian in dealing with enemy property, and if the property involved in this and similar suits had not been taken, as it was, it could admittedly have been taken by the Alien Property Custodian, in which event there would have been no jurisdiction in this court.

In Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch 110, the Circuit Court had condemned certain pine lumber seized as enemy property. The

court's action was sought to be sustained upon the mere fact of the declaration of war. This the Supreme Court said was not sufficient, but that legislative action was essential to confer upon courts authority to condemn enemy property. Chief Justice Marshall said, page 122: "That war gives to the sovereign full right to take the persons and confiscate the property of the enemy wherever found, is conceded. The mitigations of this rigid rule, which the humane and wise policy of modern times has introduced into practice, will more or less affect the exercise of this right, but can not impair the right itself. That remains undiminished, and when the sovereign authority shall choose to bring it into operation, the judicial department must give effect to its will. But until that will shall be expressed, no power of condemnation can exist in the court." The court could not pronounce a sentence of condemnation in the absence of legislative authority so to do. In the instant case the court is asked [fol. 15] to order compensation for enemy property seized by authority of a legislative act that is silent on the question of jurisdiction. As already stated, the taking of private property for public use by the Government, and for which the Fifth Amendment requires compensation to be made, falls within the class of claims founded upon implied contract, and the duty imposed by this amendment is an essential element in raising the necessary implication of an agreement to pay.

But the limitations or restrictions of the Fifth Amendment do not affect the exercise of the war power conferred upon Congress when enemy property is taken. It was said in Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268, 304 that where the statutes were "an exercise of the war powers of the Government, it is clear they are not affected by the restrictions imposed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments." (See Herrera case, 222 U. S. 558, 572.) It was added: "The Constitution confers upon Congress expressly power to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules respecting captures on land and water. Upon the exercise of these powers no restrictions are imposed. Of course the power to declare war involves the power to prosecute it by all means and in any manner in which war may be legitimately prosecuted. It therefore includes the right to seize and confiscate all property of an enemy and to dispose of it at the will of the captor. This is and always has been an undoubted belligerent right." See Morrisdale Coal Co. Case, 55 C. Cls., 310, 315; Salamandra Ins. Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 254 Fed. 852, 858; Fischer v. Palmer, 259 Fed. 355, 358.

In Green's Case, 10 C. Cls. 466, the facts were that the plaintiff, a citizen of the United States, was domiciled in Nashville, Tennessee. On the 16th day of February, 1862, while the capture of Nashville by the United States Army was imminent and expected, plaintiff went south with a large amount of his firm's moneys, which he took for investment. "While absent from his residence, he was not engaged in giving aid or encouragement to the rebellion, other than such as might arise from his voluntarily leaving his domicile and remaining within the Confederate lines and having commercial deal-

ings with the people." When he left Nashville he was the owner of certain rent-producing buildings occupied by tenants and left in charge of his agent. The agent continued to collect the rents and care for the buildings until December, 1864, when they were seized by the special supervising agent of the Treasury as abandoned property, who collected the rents until July 8, 1865. The suit brought in October, 1870, was to recover these rents. The authority for taking the property was the act of July 2, 1864, 13 Stat. 375, which did not in terms prescribe a remedy. The opinion of the court, delivered by Judge Nott, says that "the case presents, with unusual clearness, the question whether the Government is judicially liable for any of the war measures resorted to in the late rebellion other than the liability created by the abandoned or captured property act," and states the question to be whether the Government is liable for the acts of its officers, done under color of its authority within the insurrectionary district, where the party injured was loyal and the circumstances were such as would give a citizen in time of peace a right of action against the Government under the mandate of the Constitution that private property should not be taken for public [fol. 16] use without just compensation. Declaring that it made no difference in the applicable rule whether the property was taken by the Army or the Navy, or by an officer of the Treasury, the court concluded that the Government was not liable upon implied contract. The court said (p. 471): "It is inevitable that a war must be prosecuted rigorously, and it is desirable that it be prosecuted as little to the injury of a government's own citizens as possible. In the prosecution of a war the discretion of a government, so far as the enemy is concerned, takes the place of ordinary constitutional restrictions or statutory provisions."

To relieve the rigor of the situation, the act of March 12, 1863, commonly called the abandoned or captured property act, was enacted. It was a beneficent piece of legislation, and, speaking of it, the court say in Klein's Case, 13 Wall. 128, 138: "There is, so far as we are aware, no similar legislation mentioned in history." It created a right where none existed before, Anderson Case, 9 Wall. 56, and authorized suits under specified conditions for the proceeds of sales of property that had been taken or seized as "enemy property." Although it was recognized, as was said in Lamar v. Brown, 92 U. S. 187, 195, that the United States, during the Civil War, occupied the position of "both belligerent and constitutional sovereign," it was also recognized, and uniformly held, that it was only in virtue of the act mentioned that even the loyal citizen, whether he resided in the one or the other of the sections, could assert in the Court of Claims compensation for his property that had been seized or appropriated as enemy property. The theory of an implied contract arising out of such seizure or appropriation finds no support in the decided cases. In Young's Case, 97 U. S. 39, 67, it was said of the British subject, in whose right the suit was brought: "Collie has been deprived of no right he ever had. Neither he nor any one similarily situated has ever been permitted to sue the United

States in their own courts upon such a claim." See Klein Case, 13 Wall. 128, 137; Moore Case, 10 C. Cls. 375, 383; Haycraft Case, 22 Wall. 81, 92; Hijo Case, 194 U. S. 315.

In the Herrera Case, 43 C. Cls. 430, the plaintiff insisted that there was an implied contract, but this court held it had not jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, and quoted from the Hijo Case, 194 U. S. 315, 320, where it is said: "The vessel was therefore to be deemed enemy's property. It was seized as property of that kind, for purposes of war and not for any purposes of gain." The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court. In the course of their opinion, reference is made to the modern rules of war, stated by Kent (1 Kent, 92, 93), and which are in substance urged here, and the opinion proceeds: "If th record presented such a case, the question could be raised whether it presented one for judicial cognizance, even if a court could share the indignation which the learned commentator says all mankind would feel. It is certain that the court's power can not be enlarged by its emotions." Herrera Case, 222 U. S. 558, 572.

The second section of the resolution directed that a survey be made, the results of which should be competent evidence in any proceedings for compensation. This provision is entirely consistent with the idea that Congress intended to reserve for future determination any question of compensation. It falls short of conferring power [fol. 17] upon this court to determine it. It is significant when the policy of legislation during the war is considered that provision was made for action against the Government in all cases where it was intended to confer the right. Nothwithstanding this court had the power to hear and determine suits against the Government conferred by section 145 of the Judicial Code, the numerous statutes authorizing requisitions and the taking of private property expressly designated the court where suits could be brought. Some of these conferred jurisdiction on the Court of Claims; some on District courts, and some on both of these courts. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in the Pfitsch case, 256 U. S. 547, 552, says: "A survey of the war legislation permitting the seizure of property discloses that Congress has established three distinct jurisdictions for the purpose of suit against the United States for compensation." He mentions 25 different instances. The Government can not be sued without its consent, and the power to hear and determine suits against the United States should not and does not rest in mere inference or implication. It was said in Haycraft's case, 22 Wall. 81, 92: "A sovereign can not be sued in his own courts except with his consent. This is an action against the United States in its own Court of Claims. The appellant must, therefore, show that consent has been given to its prosecution." Every court must take notice of the limits of its jurisdiction. Reid case, 211 U. S. 529. It was suggested in argument in some of this class of cases that the Government took charge of the railroads under provisions of the national defense act, which did not prescribe a method for ascertaining compensation. But this action taken in an emergency was followed by a statute, which provided the necessary forum. The trading with the enemy

act authorizing the Alien Property Custodian to take over and to dispose of enemy property did not permit suits by the enemy owners. Nor does the joint resolution of May 12 authorize suits by the German owners of the vessels. If this resolution can be made the basis of the suits they could have been instituted as soon as the President took action under it. Can it be supposed that the Government intended to open its courts to enemies seeking compensation for property taken from them while the war was yet flagrant? The history of the enactment rebuts any such idea. A joint resolution was introduced and referred in the Senate and in the House. As reported to the Senate by its committee, the joint resolution contained five sections. (Cong. Rec., vol. 55, pt. 2, p. 1572). The first two sections contained all that was finally adopted. The three other sections purported to authorize suits to be brought by parties interested in the vessels and had provisions relative to suits. By section 5 the suits could be brought in the Court of Claims. All of sections 3, 4, and 5 thus reported were stricken out by amendment in the Senate. (Cong. Rec., vol. 55, pt. 2, p. 1575.) An amendment proposed by Senator Knox authorizing the President to "requisition" the vessels was voted down. (Cong. Rec., vol. 55, pt. 2, pp. 1575, 1576.) The joint resolution as amended was adopted by the Senate, and in that shape was sent to the House, where it was taken up, superseding the one on its calendar, and passed as it came from the Senate. This definite action by the Senate, concurred in by the House, confirms the view that there was no intention to authorize [fol. 18] suits in the Court of Claims on account of the seizure of these vessels. See Pfitsch case, supra.

The plaintiff argues that the United States did not confiscate or intend to confiscate the property and that the taking must consequently be referred to the power of eminent domain with a duty to make compensation. What we have said sufficiently answers this contention. We do not think it necessary to assert that there was a confiscation, nor to deny that the Congress may have intended that the United States would at some time account for the vessels or their ascertained value. If this court is without jurisdiction, its conclusions upon these questions would probably be coram non judice. The result, however, in this case, would not be altered if the proper conclusion were that the taking over of the vessels amounted to a sequestration of them. The act authorizing their seizure did not confer power on the Court of Claims to entertain the present suit, nor does its general jurisdiction extend to suits of this kind. It was said in Haycraft's case, supra: It is for Congress, not the courts, to determine whether this jurisdiction shall be extended and other remedies provided."

The demurrer should be sustained. And it is so ordered.

Graham, Judge; Hay, Judge; Downey, Judge, and Booth, Judge, concur.

[fol. 19] VI. PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR AND ORDER ALLOWING APPEAL—Filed June 3, 1924

From the judgment rendered in the above-entitled cause on the 17th day of March, 1924, in favor of the defendant, the claimant, by its attorney, on this 3rd day of June, 1924, makes application for, and gives notice of, an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Edgar W. Hunt, Attorney for Claimant.

Ordered: That the above application for appeal be allowed as prayed for.

By the Court.

June 17, 1924.

[fol. 20] COURT OF CLAIMS OF THE UNITED STATES

[Title omitted]

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

I, F. C. Kleinschmidt, Assistant Clerk Court of Claims, certify that the foregoing are true transcripts of the pleadings in the above-entitled cause; of the argument and submission of the case on demurrer; of the order of the court dismissing plaintiff's petition, with memorandum by the court; of the opinion of the court referred to in court's memorandum; of the plaintiff's application for an appeal and of the allowance by the court of said application.

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said court at Washington City this Twentieth day of June, A. D., 1924.

F. C. Kleinschmidt, Assistant Clerk Court of Claims. (Seal of the Court of Claims.)

Endorsed on cover: File No. 30,446. Court of Claims. Term No. 481. North German Lloyd, appellant, vs. The United States. Filed June 25th, 1924. File No. 30,446.